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Cognition, Representation and Security
Community Building in the Baltic Sea Region
Frank Möller
Zusammenfassung
In Verbindung mit anderen sozialwissenschaftlichen Ansätzen können
kognitive Ansätze helfen, die Frage zu beantworten, ob die Ostseeregion
bereits als Sicherheitsgemeinschaft im Sinne von Karl Deutsch verstanden
werden kann. Obwohl viele Arbeiten vorliegen, die das analytische Konzept
der Sicherheitsgemeinschaft in der einen oder anderen Form auf die
Ostseeregion anwenden, ist die kognitive Dimension in der Literatur bisher
nicht betont worden. In dem Artikel wird das Konzept der
Sicherheitsgemeinschaft zunächst konzeptionell vorgestellt und historisch
eingeordnet. Es folgt eine Diskussion ausgewählter Aspekte
zwischenstaatlicher und gesellschaftlicher Beziehungen in der Region im
Lichte kognitiver und diskursanalytischer Ansätze. Der Schwerpunkt der
Darstellung liegt auf den Beziehungen zwischen den baltischen Staaten
und Russland. Abschließend werden kognitive Ansätze vor allem in
methodologischer Hinsicht problematisiert und mögliche
Forschungsorientierungen skizziert.
Frank Möller is a Research Fellow at the Tampere Peace Research
Institute, University of Tampere/Finland.
Security Communities as Mental Constructions1
Security communities are social institutions comprising groups of people
who base their mutual interactions on dependable expectations of peaceful
change.2 These expectations are mainly derived from compatible values
relevant to political decision making and mutual responsiveness. “Security
community” is both an analytical concept and the label for the sum of
diverse processes of social interaction which in themselves need not to
have anything to do with security, for example economic transactions,
relationships among the elite, social communication, mobility of persons
and so on. The driving force behind these processes of social interaction is
not a search for security, but their result is a sense of community and a
we-feeling: individuals in a group have come to the conclusion that
“common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of
‘peaceful change’”, i.e. without resort to large-scale physical force. Then,
they have become integrated in the sense that they have attained “a ‘sense
of community’ and […] institutions and practices strong enough and
widespread enough to assure, for a ‘long’ time, dependable expectations of
‘peaceful change’”.3
This chain of definitions is not without problems. For example, what does
“long” mean? The use of inverted commas indicates both the desirability of
some temporal qualification and the difficulty of establishing a non-arbitrary
measure. As a consequence, integration is said to be “a matter of fact, not
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of time”.4 Once people have become integrated, it matters little how long
the process of security community building took. It may indeed take
decades or even generations until the threshold is crossed beyond which
groups of people neither expect nor prepare for war with fellow members of
the security community, and this threshold may be crossed and re-crossed
several times. A linear development towards a security community is but
one of several possible paths. The span of roughly fifteen years after the
end of the bloc antagonism is, historically, a blink of an eye, but it is
important that the peaceful changes of the 1990s in the Baltic Sea region
have not been interrupted by regression to more violent forms of dealing
with conflicts (save for some violent situations in Lithuania and Latvia in
1991). Yet, without subscribing to the argument used by realism in the last
resort to set bounds to alternative interpretations – the issue of uncertainty
in international relations – a note of warning may be in order: security
community building may fail even after a promising beginning. Likewise, a
security community may not prove stable in the event. A merging of
formerly independent units in one single unit with a common government –
what Deutsch called amalgamation5 – is even more difficult to attain and to
preserve than a pluralistic security community, i.e. a community “which
retains the legal independence of separate governments”.6 Furthermore,
the amalgamated type has not been found to be more stable than its
pluralistic counterpart.7 In any case, in the Baltic Sea region an
amalgamated security community is not on the cards. Even the most
ambitious integration project, the enlargement of the European Union, will
not include Russia. The Council of the Baltic Sea States, on the other hand,
does include all political actors in the region but, due to its organizational
principle and mandate, it cannot be considered an amalgamated political
community. It is reassuring, then, that Deutsch and associates considered
pluralism “the major and most general policy goal to be sought”.8
A security community is characterized by stability of expectations of
continuing peaceful adjustment. Peaceful change alone thus does not make
a security community. To a large extent security community building is a
mental process.9 It is not about peaceful change, but about expectations of
peaceful change; it is not about community, but about a sense of community
and a we-feeling. It has to do with beliefs which may be defined as
“propositions that policy makers hold to be true, even if they cannot be
verified”.10 Like all political action, security community building reflects
perceptions and interpretations as well as meaning attached to both. It is
also important to note that security communities are concerned not only
with the narrow circle of policy makers but, rather, with groups of people
and individuals in a group in general.11 Perceptions and beliefs are
somewhat intangible subject matters but a number of methodological
approaches have been suggested in the literature, among which content
analysis – understood here as the study and contextualization of the texts
produced by an individual or an organization as well as the analysis of the
relationship between these texts – seems to be one of the more promising
and methodologically feasible approaches,12 with “text” meaning less than
all available textual materials, but more than just the official security policy
statements. To give preference to national security documents would
presuppose a value judgement according to which these documents are
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more important and more significant texts than others. This procedure
would confirm the traditional understanding and logic of state-centred
security which the concept of a security community precisely aspires to
transcend.
Studying beliefs, contexts and contents is rendered even more difficult by
the fact that the relationship between beliefs and policy is not as
straightforward as attitudinal research is sometimes inclined to take for
granted.13 Discourse analysis holds that beliefs are translated into policies
through systems of language establishing “the rules governing what can be
said and what not”. Discourse analysis therefore argues that because
“[s]tructures within discourse condition possible policies” it is more important
– and methodologically easier – to analyze language and structures of
language than beliefs.14 It does not expound the problems of the
relationship between what is being said and what is being thought and
believed. Yet, security communities are as much mental constructions as
they are material constructions. They are something that has to be believed
in, expected, sensed, thought and felt. In the light of the specific research
interest motivating this article – security community building in the Baltic
Sea region – it is therefore suggested that the clear separation of discursive
from cognitive approaches is not the most appropriate analytical tool.
Rather, different discursive structures and belief systems, especially
collective belief systems, are interrelated, influencing, shaping and
regulating each other. Furthermore, different discursive structures can exist
simultaneously, overlap and compete with each other, and belief systems
can help to explain why preference is given to one discursive structure
rather than another in a given situation. Finally, discourse analysis cannot
analyze the different degrees of internalization of the belief in the
identification with one another in terms of security. As it will be suggested in
the conclusions, such an analysis is indispensable in understanding security
community building. Deutsch and his team were sceptical about the
relevance of acts of articulation to security community building: “The
populations of different territories might easily profess verbal attachment to
the same set of values without having a sense of community that leads to
political integration.”15 Likewise, constructivists and realists stress the
“strategic role of deception in public statements” and emphasize that it is
often misleading to rely on what actors say.16
While concentrating on the belief system of a single decision maker
considerably facilitates the empirical task, it (over-)simplifies both the social
nature of most decision making processes and the equally social nature of
the construction of individual belief systems. While the focus on high policy
issues such as security is still an important research orientation, both the
low policy components of security communities and the general trend
towards desecurization in the Baltic Sea region throughout the 1990s
require the inclusion in the analysis of low policy issues. While a research
focus on images of the external enemy and external others has a long
tradition in the disciplines of international politics and peace research, the
study of images of internal enemies (the Other at home) seems to be an
equally important analytical task given the population composition in the
Baltic states, especially in Latvia and Estonia, and the frequent depiction,
especially in the first half of the 1990s, of the Russian-speaking population
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as potential “fifth columns”, thus mixing domestic and foreign policy
issues.17
On the Origins of the Security Community Pattern
It is useful to remember that “security” as a concept was a fairly new
invention when Deutsch and his team constructed their approach to
peaceful changes. Indeed, as a concept it was almost non-existent, and to
the extent that it did exist, it was a political rather than an analytical concept.
Embodied in the United States National Security Act of 1947, the
introduction of the term “security” helped render security the primary goal of
the state; national security became the national interest; security was
equated with national security defined in terms of the security of the state
and to be realized primarily with military means. The 1947 National Security
Act helped transforming security into something which “belonged primarily
to the state; people, like the armed forces, were its instruments, and also,
potentially, its enemies”.18 Security was organized according to the internal
logic of the state in the following decades.
Perhaps to dissociate themselves from this particular reading of security,
Deutsch and associates referred to “political” rather than “security”
community in the title of their study. Their approach in fact was in
contradistinction to both the official political view and the view prevalent in
the academic establishment at that time. Their writings on security
communities profoundly challenged the conventional scholarly wisdom. The
concept did not fit into the dominant security logic. Firstly, its societal focus
on integration among groups of people, which may or may not be organized
in a nation-state, violated the prevailing state-centrism. Secondly, the
concept did not match the military-centrism of that time because it
deliberately downplayed military issues. Even the effects of foreign threats
were seen as only transitory: “Most often they provided an impetus toward
temporary military alliances, while more permanent unions derived their
main support from other factors”.19 Thirdly, the concept did not fit into the
materialism-centrism of that time because it was to a large extent interested
in non-material and social factors such as shared beliefs and expectations,
communication, social interaction and learning.
The concept also challenged the basic patterns of the then leading school
of thought in international politics, realism. Firstly, by investigating the
sources of peace rather than those of war, “Karl Deutsch took the classical
problematic of realism and changed it slightly to generate a new research
program”20. Secondly, by establishing that durable expectations of peaceful
change between states and societies are indeed possible in an anarchic
environment, Deutsch questioned core realist assumptions such as the
security dilemma. Thirdly, by stressing that security communities have often
developed around a core of strength, Deutsch disagreed with core realist
assumptions with respect to the balancing behaviour of states. Fourthly, by
focusing on beliefs rather than material factors, he rejected realism’s
mechanical understanding of states’ behaviour as following from objectively
measurable material, especially military capabilities. Fifthly, rather than
treating national security as a “symbol [which] suggests protection through
power”21, Deutsch understood security in terms of community building.
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Finally, peace within a security community did not require a Leviathan but
rather a pluralistic framework involving state and non-state actors.
Recent Research
Recent research on security communities has focused mainly on three
dimensions. The first is a constructivist reformulation of the original security
community pattern. Like the original concept, it theoretically reflects the
existence of political community at the international level, identification with
one another in terms of security and aims to develop the original writings
further theoretically, conceptually and methodologically. It seems, however,
that the distance to the original writings is sometimes exaggerated.
Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, for example, stress that power can
function as a magnet, especially in its alternative understanding as “the
authority to determine shared meaning that constitutes the ‘we-feeling’ and
practices of states and the conditions which confer, defer, or deny access to
the community and the benefits it bestows on its members”.22 Here, they
are indeed close to the original concept’s emphasis on cores of strength
around which integrative processes often develop.23 Likewise, their
differentiation between a loosely coupled and a tightly coupled security
community is in accordance with the original concept's understanding of a
security community as a process.24
The second focus in the current research on security communities is on the
origins of the Nordic security community. In the original writings, Deutsch
and his associates regarded the historical Norwegian-Swedish Union as an
amalgamated security community,25 albeit one which was characterized by
only limited amalgamation26 and prevented from full amalgamation by
Norwegian fears of a permanent minority status,27 different threat
perceptions in the 1890s with resulting disagreement about the level of
military burdens and joint defence against Russia,28 insufficient
responsiveness on the part of the Swedish government in regard to the rise
of political parties in Norway in the second half of the 19th century29 and the
lack of Norwegian support for full amalgamation.30 Consequently, the Union
failed. Its dissolution was accelerated by both Norwegian opinion’s
willingness in 1905 “to accept the possibility of a short war against Sweden
in order to cut the last ties of Norwegian dependence on that country”31 and
a Swedish shift towards “a policy of greater firmness and potential coercion
vis-à-vis Norway”.32 After the dissolution of the Union, integration was
achieved between Norway and Sweden in the form of a pluralistic security
community since 1907.33 The Scandinavian states, i.e. Denmark, Norway
and Sweden, were inconsistently considered a “still-developing security-
community”34 and a pluralistic security community.35 Finland is discussed in
connection with the Scandinavian security community only once and is not
yet seen as a full member.36 The current research has added more clarity
with regard to the origins of the Nordic security community by, firstly,
explaining northern anomalies37 and, secondly, analyzing so-called
“non-wars”, i.e. situations which had the potential to, but did not violently
escalate, thus serving as formative events for the Nordic security
community.38
The third focus of the recent work on security communities is on the
NORDEUROPAforum
Zeitschrift für Politik,
Wirtschaft und Kultur
ISSN 1863639X
2/2003
13. Jahrgang (6. der N.F.)
Seiten 61-85
Textanfang
Zusammenfassung
Security Communities as Mental
On the Origins of the Security
Recent Research
Ways of Thinking about Russia
Explaining Changes in Represen
Conclusions
Fußnoten
zur Startseite
NORDEUROPAforum | Artikel | Frank Möller
discussion of the extent to which the Baltic Sea region can already be
referred to in terms of a security community. Peter Wallensteen and
associates explored this question as early as in 1994. They came to the
conclusion that, regardless of individual routes to military security among
the Baltic Sea states, deficiencies in institution-building and uncertainties as
to the developments in the Russian Federation, “in a long-term perspective
the Baltic Region has been heading towards what Deutsch would label ‘a
security community’”39. The nationalization of military security has been
avoided by the current and future NATO membership of Poland, Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania, the comprehensive Partnership for Peace program
and the general trends during the 1990s towards a soft security agenda.
Furthermore, security communities do not require common institutions. The
Nordic security community is a case in point. Here, the importance to
conflict resolution of formal foreign and security policy institutions lies
precisely in their absence. Indeed, “the Nordic resolution of conflicts is not
directly related to the efficiency of Nordic organs”.40 Nordic institutions are
effects rather than causes of peaceful conflict resolution. In the Baltic Sea
region, however, the institutionalization of the Council of the Baltic Sea
States has to some extent remedied the deficiencies in institution-building
observed by Wallensteen and associates and contributed to peaceful
conflict resolution and the softening of the security agenda.41
The developments in the Russian Federation seem to be more predictable
today than ten years ago, in particular when it comes to the issue of
peaceful conflict resolution. Throughout the 1990s Russia’s Baltic policy
was one of peaceful and reactive adaptation including, until the summer of
1994, the peaceful management of a process as militarily-strategically
challenging, technically complicated and politico-psychologically demanding
as the troop withdrawal from the Baltic states. In the second half of the
decade, it was a policy of what Graeme Herd has called “constructive
engagement” which refers to substantial Russian disarmament in the Baltic
Sea region and North-west Russia; a series of security conferences initiated
by the then Prime Minister Chernomyrdin in the autumn of 1997, combining
hard with soft security issues; then President Yeltsin’s “Northern Bridge”
initiative; and a set of soft security initiatives in January 1998. Russia’s
overall Baltic policy thus changed from one focusing on hard security issues
to one stressing soft security issues.42 The Russian government surprised
its neighbours by offering security guarantees to the Baltic states in 1997 in
exchange for their remaining outside of military alliances, a connection
which was “apparently removed later”43. It also surprised some sceptical
observers by dismantling the radar station in the Latvian town of Skrunda
according to schedule. Furthermore, after years of fierce anti-enlargement
rhetoric and the threat of counter-measures, Russia grudgingly accepted
NATO enlargement and the inclusion of Poland and the Baltic states in
NATO.
Regardless of these positive trends, however, peaceful change has not yet
been translated into dependable expectations of peaceful change, and the
degree of trust accumulated during the 1990s as a result of peaceful conflict
resolution and social interaction does not seem to be sufficient to refer
justifiably to the Baltic Sea region already in terms of a security
community.44 Yet, acknowledging the existence of differences, exhibiting
NORDEUROPAforum
Zeitschrift für Politik,
Wirtschaft und Kultur
ISSN 1863639X
2/2003
13. Jahrgang (6. der N.F.)
Seiten 61-85
Textanfang
Zusammenfassung
Security Communities as Mental
On the Origins of the Security
Recent Research
Ways of Thinking about Russia
Explaining Changes in Represen
Conclusions
Fußnoten
zur Startseite
NORDEUROPAforum | Artikel | Frank Möller
self-restraint while pursuing one’s own security interests as well as believing
and showing that “common social problems must and can be resolved by
processes of ‘peaceful change’”45 appear to be quite promising blocks on
which to build a sustainable process towards a pluralistic security
community in the region.
One of the most difficult problems to be solved relating to security
community building in the Baltic Sea region is to develop expectations of
peaceful change between the states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and
their respective societies on the one hand and the Russian state and
society on the other.46 Other difficult problems include the evolution of trust
between the different segments of the society within the Baltic states and
the improvement of the relations between Poland and Russia, in particular
on the cultural-intellectual stage. The first aspect – the development of trust
within the Baltic states – does not have to be discussed here. States,
according to Deutsch, are political communities which function as security
communities when revolution, secession and civil war are neither expected
nor prepared for.47 In the early 1990s there were two situations which are
occasionally referred to in the literature in terms of autonomy movements,
the one in the south-eastern part of Lithuania when, in 1991, parts of the
Slavic population of the Vilnius region sought to form an autonomous region
within Lithuania,48 the other in the north-eastern part of Estonia when, in
1993, a referendum on local autonomy was initiated. Here, widespread
dissatisfaction with both the adoption by the Estonian parliament of a law on
the status of aliens and economic developments coincided with a local
power struggle, but neither large-scale violence nor a war of secession
loomed behind the temporary increase of tensions.49 None of the two
situations resulted in autonomy, not to mention secession.
The second aspect – Polish-Russian relations – is excluded from this article
primarily because it would require a study of its own. Suffice it to say here
that some ingredients of the Polish discourse on Poland’s eastern policies
still seem to be far away from expectations of peaceful change and shared
values. On the political level business-like relations are being developed.
Yet, as Alexei Miller shows, the discourse on Russia among Polish
intellectuals still contains representations of Russia as a “civilization of
death” as opposed to representations of the European Union as a
“civilization of life”. Russia is referred to in terms of the incurable Other, from
which Lithuania, Belarus and especially Ukraine have to be protected.
Likewise, it has been called for Polish policy to contain Russia and by so
doing protect Poland and Europe.50 These representations follow a
Huntingtonian logic of a clash of civilizations51 and reflect the Western
tradition of ‘otherizing’ Russia which is neither a Polish speciality nor an
invention of the 20th century. Rather, it can be traced back in the West
European history of ideas to the second half of the 18th century and went
through a profound renaissance as an ingredient of the “central Europe”
discourse of the late 1980s and early 1990s.52
In the remainder, the article zooms in on one specific question, namely the
ways of thinking about and representing Russia in Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania throughout the 1990s, including a discussion of discursive and
cognitive explanations. In the conclusions, a rather sober assessment will
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be made as to the state of cognitive approaches to the study of security
communities and some orientations for future research will be given.
Ways of Thinking about Russia in the Baltic States
Referring to others as “rootless” is an ingredient of the standard European
repertoire of representing the Other, be it a German, a Britain, or a Russian
who is the Other. Yet, only in the case of Russia, “this is a stable feature of
discourse throughout the 19th century and beyond”. As Iver B. Neumann
shows, the “metaphors of the Russians as nomadic barbarians, always on
the move, pegging their tents on the outskirts of Europe, looming like an
incubus, belong to a fixed imagery which would also crop up occasionally
in, say, contemporary French constructions of the British (or in British
20th-century constructions of Germans)”.53Just as Huntingtonian as the
Polish case discussed above, in Estonia a significant factor in the cultural
identity of the Baltic countries is said to have been “living on the border of
Western civilization”:
We maintain that the most decisive role in the collapse of the
Soviet Union was played […] by the civilizational conflict
between the Russian-Soviet Empire, the “New Byzantium” of
the 20th century, and the Baltic and other East-European
nations, representing the Western traditions of individual
autonomy and civil society. […] For Estonians and other
people with a Western mind-set, living under the Soviets
meant a “clash of civilizations” inside the mind of every
single individual, the loss of personal integrity, and even the
loss of the right to an authentic life-world.54
Representations of Russia in the debates over Finnishness in the 19th
century, however, are said to have in general been neutral or benign. Only
after Finland’s independence negative stereotypes of Russia / the Soviet
Union have emerged and gained the upper hand. Detaching Finland clearly
from Russia / the Soviet Union aimed at both supporting the state building
process and bridging internal social and class cleavages which had become
manifest during the Civil War.55 Moving from politics to the quotidian lives of
ordinary people, Vieda Skultāns’ analysis of personal accounts in
post-Soviet Latvia supports the notion of beliefs in clear attitudinal and
behavioural boundaries:
Love of solitude, of one’s home, of the homeland, love of
work and self-control are all consciously used to symbolize
the boundaries between Latvians and non-Latvians.
Conversely, non-Latvians are distinguished by the absence
of these traits. […] For example, Latvians’ love of quiet and
solitude are contrasted with Russian love of noise and
crowds. References are made to the Latvian tradition of
living in isolated farmsteads and contrasted with the Russian
tradition of villages. The ideal situation for a house is thought
to be one where no sign of human habitation is visible. The
Latvian habit of speaking quietly and calmly is contrasted
with Russian habits of loud talking and shouting. Latvians
pride themselves on being self-controlled, whereas Russians
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are thought to lack discipline and self-control: they swear
and drink. Latvians characterize themselves by their extreme
attachment to locality and to the idea of a Latvian homeland.
Russians are perceived as rootless, ready to move to where
the going is good.56
In addition to personal experience, the reproduction of stereotyped
ostensible national characteristics in literary anthologies, history and school
books influences the Latvian image of Russians.57 The above references
are not meant to argue for a return to the traditional political culture
approach in search of national characters and national images which are
referred to in order to explain foreign policy.58 But stereotypes and myths
are a part of the cognitive context within which representations of and policy
manifestations on Russia are articulated in Latvia and, by implication, also
in Estonia and Lithuania. This context includes past victimization in the
sense of experiences of war, occupation, collectivization, imprisonment,
deportation and the loss of independence which were an integral ingredient
of the lives of many Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians in the 20th century.
Although referring to past victimization carries with it the danger of seeing
the present and future primarily through the lenses of the past, cognitive
systems are inseparably connected with individual and collective
experiences as well as with overall history and, as Anatol Lieven has put it,
with “myth as history and history as myth”59. Individual experiences of the
Soviet time, characterized by arbitrariness and chance, persist in the
post-Soviet time and arguably result in a specific inertia of the belief system.
This belief system can be assumed to be relatively impervious to change
because “[w]hat is experienced as history by one generation becomes
structure for the next”60. Focussing analytically on the front stage behaviour
as represented in policy manifestations while ignoring the back stage
behaviour as embodied in the cognitive structure may result in an
inadequate understanding of what is being said and the degree of
internalization in the belief system of the speaker. These questions are
relevant to the issue of security community building since – as was argued
above – security communities are to a large extent based on mental
structures. Which thought patterns can then be revealed behind
representations of Russia in the political discourse on security in the Baltic
states during the 1990s? The following list is suggestive, not exhaustive.
Estonia, in the words of the then Minister of Defence, Hain Rebas, in
December 1992 was confronted with “dangers from the East”. Likewise,
Colonel Ants Laaneots saw the threat to Estonia emanating from the East.
The Speaker of the Estonian Parliament, Ülo Nugis, declared that “NATO
and only NATO can provide us with sufficient security guarantees against
Russia”. The then Lithuanian Minister of National Defence, Audrius
Butkevičius, in February 1993 saw indirect rather than direct threats
emerging from both the increasing instability in what used to be the Soviet
Union and “growing tendencies of authoritarianism and nationalism in the
territory of the former Soviet Union, above all in Russia” which could
possibly involve Lithuania.61
The Latvian Defence Minister Kristovskis depicted Russia as still adhering
to “old ambitions and historic nostalgia”. Likewise, according to the Latvian
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President, Vaira Viķe-Freiberga, Russia still has “nostalgia for the Soviet
Empire” and her Estonian counterpart at that time, Lennart Meri, added that
“[i]n the East we see with regret the rebirth of Russian chauvinism and
readiness to sacrifice basic human values in the name of power”. According
to Gintaras Tamulaitis, Lithuania, in developing military structures, assumes
to “face no military threat from the West: Lithuania regards the West as a
guarantor of its security, a natural and trustworthy partner”. This statement
renders it unnecessary to state explicitly who is seen as a threat to
Lithuanian security. Likewise, Kristovskis emphasizes that Latvia has
“friendly neighbours to the north (Estonia) and south (Lithuania), but she
also shares several hundred kilometres of border with Russia and
Byelorussia”.62
While the discourse on security in the first years after gaining independence
had been governed by representing Russia as a direct or indirect threat to
Baltic security, the patterns of argumentation later changed. To be sure,
Russia was still seen as a threat to national security. Yet, it was not longer
the representation of Russia as predictably malevolent which guided the
interpretation. Rather, Russia was depicted as unpredictable and instable,
and this was in itself seen as a threat to security. Numerous references
could be given here. Consider the following examples. According to Aare
Raid, “[t]he main threat to the national security of Estonia remains the
unpredictability of the development of the democratization process in
Russia”. According to Atis Lejiņš, “[w]hat threatens Baltic independence is
the same as what the West fears – the unpredictability of the future of
Russia and its inability to overcome its imperial past”. Miglé Budryté adds
that “[t]he major external risks for Lithuania’s security today are connected
with instability on the territory of Russia and the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS), which is characterized by inter-regional, ethnic-
religious, territorial and/or social conflicts”. According to Vaira
Viķe-Freiberga, “Russia is extremely unpredictable. […] The simple fact of
unpredictability scares me”.63
Another constant feature of the representations of Russia is the equation of
Russia with the Soviet Union. In Graeme Herd’s estimation there is a “close
association in the minds of Baltic decision-makers of Soviet and Russian
imperial traditions and ambitions”.64 To some extent, this confusion is not
surprising. After all, the Russian Federation is the legal successor to the
Soviet Union. One should also consider the troop withdrawal issue when
Soviet troops actually became Russian troops. The Russian army’s
temporary presence in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania was frequently seen
through the prism of the historical experience with the Soviet army. The
negotiations on the limited use of the radar station in Skrunda, Latvia, by
the Russian army are another case in point. Memories of 1939 and 1940
were often invoked in which case demanding mutual assistance
agreements and army bases in the territories of the Baltic states had indeed
preceded the Soviet occupation. Accordingly, the negotiations were
represented by some authors as a possible first step to a further occupation
of Latvia.65
To sum up, during the 1990s Russia was consistently represented either as
a direct or an indirect threat to Baltic security. Alternative interpretations
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were effectively marginalized. The patterns of argumentation were to some
extent flexible. It was either Russia’s actual or potential strength or current
weakness which was seen as threatening the Baltic states; either
predictable Russian malevolence or unpredictability; either Russian
capabilities or, if the current capabilities were regarded as insufficient,
potential future capabilities or even presupposed intentions; either Russia
as a military, political or cultural threat. The representation of Russia as a
threat to Baltic security and independence made itself fairly independent of
Russia’s factual Baltic policy which can be sketched as follows.
Firstly, it is worth repeating that Russia’s Baltic policy has been non-violent.
Secondly, almost no anti-Baltic statement on the part of Russian politicians
led to effective and enduring anti-Baltic policies; rhetoric was translated into
policy only occasionally, economic sanctions were of short duration,
provocatively labelled military exercises were the exception. Thirdly, most
anti-Baltic statements by Russian politicians have to be seen in connection
with domestic power struggles in Russia and were primarily meant for
domestic consumption. The translation of Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s invective
into considerable electoral success in December 199366 was certainly an
important event which may be seen as one of the reasons for Lithuania’s
application for NATO membership in early 1994. In general, however,
anti-Baltic rhetoric was not rewarded with electoral success. For example,
then Foreign Minister Kozyrev’s unconvincing nationalistic turn and his
attempts “to prove that he was a more genuine nationalist than Zhirinovsky
himself”67 were directed at the domestic audience but failed to attract a
major part of the electorate. The same can be said of his condemnation of
the Estonian Law on Aliens as “apartheid” and “ethnic cleansing” in 1993.
Fourthly, Russian politics towards the Baltic states were mostly reactive
rather than active. As Lieven has pointed out, the official Russian policy
has:
responded to things that the Balts have done or said, for
instance on citizenship, military withdrawal, language laws,
border claims, property questions, the status of Kaliningrad
and so on. But with rare exceptions, in the period 1991–94
[the Russians] did not actually themselves seek out or invent
disputes as part of a deliberate planned campaign to worsen
relations and create insecurity.68
Although many observers in the Baltic states frequently emphasized or took
for granted Moscow’s ostensible malevolence and hostility to the Baltic
states, the Russian leadership factually displayed, within certain limits, “a
deference to Baltic concerns, which is unique in the pattern of Russia’s
relations with its ex-Soviet neighbours”69. Fifthly, Gorbachev and
Shevardnadze were in the perestroika-glasnost period seriously interested
in the creation of what they called a Common European House based on
the CSCE model. To be sure, trying to disembark the United States from
Europe was one motive. Yet Gorbachev did see the Soviet Union as a
European state and believed in a “shared cultural heritage” on the basis of
which he aspired to reform the Soviet economic and political order. The
Russian leadership in the Yeltsin period insisted on both Russia’s
Europeanness and locating Russia within European borders. President
NORDEUROPAforum
Zeitschrift für Politik,
Wirtschaft und Kultur
ISSN 1863639X
2/2003
13. Jahrgang (6. der N.F.)
Seiten 61-85
Textanfang
Zusammenfassung
Security Communities as Mental
On the Origins of the Security
Recent Research
Ways of Thinking about Russia
Explaining Changes in Represen
Conclusions
Fußnoten
zur Startseite
NORDEUROPAforum | Artikel | Frank Möller
Putin has at several occasions reaffirmed Russia’s desire to be treated as a
part of Europe.70 Some observers in the Baltic states, however, saw things
in a different light. For example, Phillip Petersen, in November 1991, quoted
the then Vice President of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, Česlovas
Stankevičius, as saying that he
‘cannot imagine that Russia could be brought into Europe’.
In his opinion, ‘Russia is not a European country, but an
Asian country in terms of mentality.’ He argues that
‘European Russia up to the Ural Mountains is the European
part of Asia.’71
According to the then Chief Officer of the Lithuanian Ministry of European
Affairs,
Lithuania’s foreign policy after the reestablishment of
independence was based on the “realistic” premise that after
the Cold War ideas about the “common security system of
Europe” were mere rhetoric of the transition period, a guise
for the enduring disagreements between the West and
Russia, and that after a certain time new lines of division in
Europe would be drawn.72
The peculiar consistency in the representations of Russia can thus not be
explained by Russia’s actual Baltic policy. This consistency can ironically be
observed in a period during which the Baltic states aspired to integration in
Western institutions while Western representations increasingly referred to
Russia in terms of a partner. The persistent depiction of Russia in negative
terms thus violated the emerging discursive structures in the West
simultaneously with the Baltic states trying to return to the West. Intra-Baltic
discursive structures, based on rigid belief systems, dominated the
emerging European discursive structures. From a socio-psychological point
of view, this situation is not surprising because:
states that have been expansionist under one set of
circumstances or leaders are likely to be seen as posing a
continuing threat. The state’s aggressiveness will be seen as
rooted in factors such as geography and national character
that change slowly, if at all. […] [Consequently,] when one
country thinks that another is its enemy, the perception of
hostility is usually more central than other aspects of the
image […].73
Jervis then hypothesizes that “when the other acts with restraint, […] the
actor would be more likely to change his view of the other’s strength than of
its intentions”.74 Combining socio-psychological with realist assumptions,
Jervis states elsewhere that “even if the other state now supports the status
quo, it may become dissatisfied later”.75 In addition, early cognitive
approaches have shown that, while trying to keep their sets of core beliefs
as coherent as possible, actors usually adapt selectively to changes in the
environment and equally selectively process incoming information in
accordance with pre-existing beliefs.76 The representations of Russia were
indeed very coherent during the 1990s regardless of the changes in the
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internal and external environment – from quasi statehood to statehood, from
involuntary freedom from alliances to future NATO membership, from
Russian rhetorical aggressiveness to a policy of constructive engagement –
thus revealing a cognitive consistency which, in turn, is indicative of a rather
solid belief system.
Explaining Changes in Representations
What happened then at the beginning of the new millennium? Miraculously,
military threats in general and representations of Russia as a threat have
almost totally escaped from policy statements and security policy
documents in the Baltic states. The authors of the Estonian National
Security Concept have even been criticized in the Estonian media for too
strong an adaptation to the soft security discourse cultivated in the West
(prior to the 11th of September 2001).77 Here, four different explanations for
this shift shall be discussed. They are by no means mutually exclusive.
Firstly, following an explanation which focuses on instrumentality it can be
argued that the shift of emphasis reflects a failure of the earlier approaches
to membership of NATO. Baltic decision-makers seem to have understood
at that point that representations of Russia as a threat to Baltic and
European security would hardly result in an invitation to NATO membership.
Rather, their chance of becoming NATO members was inversely
proportionate to the extent to which they referred to Russia in terms of a
threat to the Baltic states in particular and “Europe” in general. Thus, it is
true that the governments of the Baltic states tried to use their perception of
a threat emanating from Russia as an argument for NATO membership,78
but it is equally true that they received an invitation to NATO only when they
abandoned their representation of Russia as a threat.
Continuing to present the Baltic states as threatened by, and as a bulwark
against, presupposed Russian aggressiveness would have been
counterproductive, for two reasons. One is that the prospects of becoming
involved in a military conflict between the Baltic states and Russia was one
of the reasons for NATO to refuse too direct and ambitious an engagement
in the Baltic region in the first half of the 1990s. The other is that during the
decade NATO has been representing Russia increasingly in terms of a
partner. Recommending oneself as a bastion against a partner would
neither make sense nor be a promising pre-accession strategy. The
rhetorical adaptation of representing Russia as unpredictable rather than
outright hostile followed just as advertising oneself in terms of protecting
“Europe” from uncertainty and unpredictability.79 Furthermore, while
developing arguments for Baltic NATO membership, Baltic decision-makers
side-tracked the Russian issue and started to emphasize what the Baltic
states have in common with the Western states rather than what
distinguishes them from Russia. Moreover, they advertised their strivings
after membership in terms of a general (re-)integrationist policy, strictly
following the rhetorical patterns given by NATO. Baltic decision-makers
adapted themselves to the official NATO parlance since the mid-1990s by
emphasizing NATO´s character as a community of values rather than one of
defence; as a political rather than a military organization (respectively as an
organization the membership of which is aspired to for political rather than
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military reasons); as something “new” (“the new NATO”); as well as by
emphasizing their own role as a contributor to, rather than a beneficiary of
security. It was both an expression of the idea of returning to the West and a
rhetorical adaptation to NATO’s anticipated set of expectations which leads
directly to the second explanation.
Discourse analysis can help to shed light on the change in the
representations of Russia at the end of the decade. Discursive analysis is
interested in rules governing articulation. It explores shared understandings
governing the use of language and differentiating that which can legitimately
be said from that which cannot. In this understanding, language does not
refer to something else – it is not a stand-in for some “hidden reality” – but,
rather, a system in itself, “giv[ing] meaning to the activities which make up
social reality”. Discourse analysis thus investigates “the relationship
between the rules and conventions of specific ‘language games’ or ‘forms of
life’ and their socio-historical and cultural meaning”.80 But language games
are also reflecting power relations. Wanting to become a member of NATO
and the European Union clearly required an adaptation to the “language
games” played in and by these two organizations. Furthermore, since the
process of transformation in the Baltic states is one of adaptation to the
Western type of political, economic and social organization, the discursive
structures within which this transformation unfolds are by and large
constituted in and by the West. Challenging them by adhering to different
“language games” is counterproductive. Sticking to the structure of
discourse prevalent in the Baltic states, which was deeply grounded in
cognitive structures, would have resulted in isolation from the Western
world.
Thirdly, the sudden disappearance of representations of Russia as a threat
at the beginning of the new millennium can also be explained in terms of a
cognitive approach. Coherent belief systems and especially core beliefs are
stable and resistant to change, but “should change occur [it is likely] that it
will be abrupt and profound”.81 Remember, for example, the October 1986
interview in which the then German Chancellor Kohl compared the Soviet
Secretary General Gorbachev with the German National Socialist Minister
of Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels,82 an expression which arguably
expressed both Kohl’s profound belief in the illegitimacy of the Soviet
system and his scepticism about the reliability and trustworthiness of the
decision makers representing this system. Without a profound and swift
change in beliefs the subsequent development of the personal relationship
between Kohl and Gorbachev would appear to have been as unlikely as the
subsequent political developments, among which the accession of the
German Democratic Republic to the purview of the Grundgesetz figures
prominently. As to the change in the representations of Russia in the Baltic
states it may be speculated that it was facilitated by the somehow more
relaxed attitude of the Russian President Putin, exhibited, for example, at
the occasion of his visit to Finland in September 2001, to the question of
Baltic NATO membership.83 Other factors explaining this change include
the stabilization of Baltic statehood, the reduction in domestic tensions and
the relaxation, within certain limits, of Baltic–Russian relations.
Finally, some words must be said about the role of the United States in
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shaping and changing the “language games” and perhaps even the belief
systems. Arguably, it is not so much the question of NATO enlargement, put
forward energetically by the US administrations, which matters most with
respect to security community building. After all, military alliances are “a
comparatively poor pathway to integration”.84 As a project excluding
Russia, NATO enlargement was the single most serious conflict in the field
of military security in the Baltic Sea region in the second half of the 1990s.
As to the resolution of this conflict, substantial credit should be given the
Clinton administration. By incorporating in its Northern Europe Initiative
(NEI), launched in 1997, a commitment to Baltic NATO membership and by
simultaneously developing a network of cooperation with Russia within the
same initiative but also within, for example, the Arctic Military Environmental
Cooperation program and the Cooperative Threat Reduction program,85 the
US administration exhibited a fairly sophisticated approach to security in
Europe’s North. The ideas underlying the US projects have changed to
some extent in the light of the reformulation of the US foreign and security
policy after the 11th of September 2001, the focus of the projects narrowed,
the initial selectivity has evaporated, some of the envisioned synergy effects
remained unfulfilled and duplication looms.86 Yet, perhaps surprisingly, the
basic lines of thought underlying the NEI still show many parallels to the
basic thought patterns of the original security community conception. The
NEI basically aims at security by political means, security rather with than
against others and cooperation among non-state and local actors in low
politics areas to foster a sense of community in the region and to make
borders transparent and permeable. By adhering to this understanding of
security and by expecting the other actors in the region to do likewise, the
US administration exercised considerable influence on Baltic decision
makers and, without neglecting their legitimate interest in military security,
helped them alter and relax their attitudes towards security. By
synchronizing the Northern Europe Initiative with the European Union’s
Northern Dimension and by adapting the NEI to existing patterns of
cooperation in Europe’s North – the Initiative indeed is a rare case of a US
foreign policy adaptation rather to than superposition on a regional
environment – the US administration furthermore contributed to what has
been called constructive redundancy.87 This is important because it can
increase responsiveness between states and societies by both providing for
“more information about one another, more attention to that information,
more joint operations, and more actual contact”88 and ensuring that
information received would adequately be understood.
The need to adequately understand information can finally be illustrated by
means of a statement by the President of the European Commission,
Romano Prodi, before a Baltic audience in February 2000. Prodi’s
comments – “any attack or aggression against an EU member nation would
be an attack or aggression against the whole EU”89 – conspicuously
resembled the words of NATO’s and WEU’s articles five and seemed to
suggest that the European Union’s deficiency relating to hard security would
finally energetically been tackled – a deficiency in particular in the eyes of
many Baltic commentators who, throughout the 1990s, had made clear that
“[w]hile EU membership will indirectly strengthen our security, especially
economic security, only NATO membership can fully ensure that democratic
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values and stability are defended”.90 Yet, Prodi later qualified his statement
by saying that the “use of the word ‘attack’ had no military significance”.
Moreover, the sense of security resulting from membership in the European
Union should not be confused with “the kind of territorial security
commitment provided by articles in the NATO and WEU treaties, which
were not part of the discussions” in Latvia and Lithuania. Rather,
membership of the EU gives a “sense of belonging [which is] in a real sense
an effective guarantee of security”.91 This, in a nutshell, is what the
European Union is about when it comes to security. This is also why the EU
is frequently referred to in terms of a security community. The new member
states will benefit from the effective guarantee of security resulting from the
sense of belonging stressed by Prodi, all the more so since EU enlargement
has not yet alienated Russia. Given these prospects, the technical problems
resulting from the enlargement of the European Union with respect to, for
example, the Kaliningrad region and the application of the Schengen visa
regime92 seem to be of only secondary importance. Indeed, if handled with
care the conflicts emanating from the enlargement may even have a
positive function for the improvement of the social relations between those
within and those outside the European Union. After all, “[i]nsofar as conflict
is the resolution of tension between antagonists it has stabilizing functions
and becomes an integrating component of the relationship” as long as “the
basic assumptions upon which the relation is founded” are not violated.93 In
a security community, the basic assumption is peaceful change. This
assumption has not been, and is not likely to be violated by the enlargement
of the European Union.
Conclusions
Rather than arguing for a strict separation between discursive and cognitive
approaches, the above discussion suggests that both (and more) are
needed. In doing so it follows the assessment put forward in cultural studies
that “different methods have their advantages in different circumstances and
can, in any case, be combined”.94 It argues against methodological
simplicity as an end in itself, but does not yet have to offer a solution to the
diverse methodological problems which are notoriously arising from the
combination of different approaches. The cognitive dimension of security
community building in the Baltic Sea region is to a large extent an empty
vessel and it still requires considerable research to fill it with contents. What
should be clear after the preceding discussion, however, is that policy
statements are no reliable indicator of a sense of community and
identification with one another in terms of security. Instrumentality,
deception, a superficial internalization of the norms and values rhetorically
adhered to in such statements and other factors require a more penetrating
approach. Following Alexander Wendt, it may be argued that a third level
internalization of norms and values is needed in order to refer justifiably to a
given form of social interaction in terms of a security community. A third
level internalization means “that people follow norms not because they think
it will serve some exogenously given end but because they think the norms
are legitimate and therefore want to follow them”.95 A third level
internalization has to be distinguished from a first level internalization –
adherence to norms because otherwise punishment would follow – and a
second level internalization – adherence to norms out of self-interest. The
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methodological problems involved in such a differentiation are tremendous.
They have been noted in the literature96 and can certainly not be solved
here.
Returning to one of the questions which are regularly addressed in the
literature on security communities in the Baltic Sea region – the extent to
which the Baltic Sea region can be referred to in terms of a security
community – and the more specific question concerning the representations
of Baltic–Russian relations sketched above, it may be said that changes in
policy manifestations, even profound ones, are no sufficient indicator of the
existence of a security community. One problem is the danger of what can
be called a simulation of community: a specific set of norms and values may
be rhetorically adhered to for instrumental purposes, i.e. in order to achieve
other gains. Behind the social mask of public verbal attachments may be
hidden differences which, if they are not addressed adequately, may in the
long term effectively undermine the process of community building.
Remember both Deutsch’s scepticism of verbal attachments cited above
and the constructivist warning against taking policy manifestations at face
value. What is required, then, is a contextualization of policy statements.
For example, regardless of the adherence in policy statements to the same
set of norms and values, the reconstruction of the socio-economic system in
the Baltic states considerably deviates from the Nordic welfare state. This
does not only seem to result from financial restrictions rendering the
evolution of a comprehensive welfare state in the Baltic states impossible in
the near future. It also reflects a different overall approach to the
relationship between the economy and the society which is partly resulting
from too much economic control and state interference and too little
economic benefits during the Soviet period.97
Furthermore, it has been noted that the representation of the EU accession
policies as policies strictly following the rules established by the European
Union is too simple. The new EU members will hardly become carbon
copies of the EU average. Indeed, in political reality a “pattern of deftly
miming Western rhetoric and playing by the so-called Western rules while
producing political effects different from those envisioned by Western
benefactors” can often be observed.98 This differentiated process of EU
accession, however, is no problem as regards security community building
as long as the basic relationships between states and societies remain
dedicated to peaceful adaptation and the basic organizing principles –
negotiated and to some extent altered in the course of the accession
process – do not display incompatible traits. A sense of community does not
require one to become precisely like the other. Rather, the issue is one of
both a partial identification with one another99 and the acknowledgement of
difference. In order to appreciate difference, however, one has to be
cognizant of it. As Edward Said lamented in a different context: “Identity,
always identity, over and above knowing about others.”100 Cognitive
approaches to the study of security communities may not only help to come
to a more adequate understanding of the processes supporting or inhibiting
the emergence of a security community. They may also help to clarify the
differences between states and societies in the Baltic Sea region.
Paradoxically, these differences may be capitalized on in order to build and
stabilize expectations of peaceful change in the region.101
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